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Truth be told, nearly all disciplines are vast tents under which radically dierent modes of operation
co-exist, sometimes peacefully, sometimes not, and most frequently somewhere in between. For ex-
ample, some physicists proceed via the axiomatic approach, and their pondering e.g. the possibility
of time travel consists in determining whether some set of formulae are consistent with a formal-
ization of such travel. Other physicists regard such activity to be \mere" logico-mathematics, not
physics, given that by their lights physics is distinguished by empirical investigation. Additional
examples could be eortlessly multiplied: Philosophy as a eld subsumes analytic philosophy and
much of formal logic, and at the same time the \fuzzy" continental tradition. Economics ranges
across sweeping historical narratives considered in political economics, and also across formal,
game-theoretic analyses of idealized situations. Computer science contains formal-methods folks
who bemoan the prevalence of software not formally veried | yet the eld is also home to those
who see it as an experimental one. And so on.
AI isn't any dierent: it too is an ecumenical tent. This is conrmed not only by the co-existence
now of both traditional AI and AGI, but by the fact that there are many much more ne-grained
methodological divisions within both. Some thinkers, for example, are rather passionate about a
logic-based approach to AI and cognitive science (e.g. Bringsjord 2008b, Bringsjord 2008a); others
are in favor of a non-symbolic, continuous approach (e.g. Spivey 2006). And ::: some people are
in favor of a serious computational science of intelligence (SCSI), whereas others are not. We
propose a workshop devoted to explicitly considering | and, frankly, promoting | this science,
which we describe in the next section.
2 What is the Serious Computational Science of Intelligence?
We confess to lacking a formal denition of the science we wish to have explicitly discussed in the
prospective workshop. But we claim that ve attributes, if embodied in a given research program,
qualify that program as an example of SCSI.
In presenting this quintet, we assume our audience to have command over computation, from
a logico-mathematical perspective; and we specically use `computation' in the broad sense that
covers not only Turing machine-level computation, but (suitably formalized) hypercomputation.1
We also assume that our readers have a suciently rm grasp of the concept of intelligence, so that
at least they can recognize it when they see it. So, with you we know that neurobiologically normal
human persons are undeniably intelligent; that apes are as well, but much less so; that dogs are
intelligent, but not as smart as apes; that rodents are even dimmer still; that while a case can be
made for classifying viruses as intelligent, the level of intelligence they possess is exceedingly slim
(but nonetheless exceedingly dangerous); and that it's easy enough to imagine beings markedly
more intelligent than any of those on the continuum just sketched.
With this pair of assumptions noted, here's the key quintet.
 Constructive? In order for this property to be instantiated, it must be the case that the re-
search/system in question is explicitly designed to produce determinate computational theories with
considerable reach (which may or may not be implemented). It's not enough for the researcher to be
merely critical, however rigorous and far-reaching the criticisms might be.
1In short, standard Turing machines compute (for coverage see e.g. Lewis & Papadimitriou 1981), and so do
innite-time Turing machines (which are dened in Hamkins & Lewis 2000). Please note that in order to qualify in
our scorecard, one doesn't have to embrace hypercomputation, but a formal orientation (which as will soon be seen
is a sine qua non for the science we have in mind) requires familiarity with computation, broadly understood.
1 Theorem-guided? In order for this property to apply, the work in question must be signicantly
guided by theorems, secured on the strength of formalization. Note that the property here entails
much more than that some formalism is used. Of course, not all the theorems in question need to
be generated by the work in question: It will sometimes be helpful if the work is classied in light of
established theorems.
 General? The research program and/or system must be intended to cover both human and machine
intelligence. This means, for example, that computational cognitive scientists, if aiming to merely
understand human intelligence, aren't suciently ambitious to qualify. (And as a matter of fact, such
scientists generally don't pursue work that has the previous attribute | which is noted in Bringsjord
2008a.)
 Continuum? To possess this property, the research in question must include the concept of a contin-
uum of intelligence, from dim to human-level to beyond us to well beyond us. (Such a continuum is
broadly discussed in Bringsjord et al. 2000.) One shortcut to satisfying the Continuum property is to
insist that candidate creatures have their intelligence explicitly tested to see just how intelligent they
are. (One fascinating test-based approach to such matters, at least when is thinking about creatures
with intelligence at the level of bright humans, is Floridi 2005.)
 Cohesive? The fth and nal requirement is that the work in question be devoted to promoting a
cohesive vision or theory. Working on frameworks for capturing pieces of intelligence is insucient.
There must be a steadfast search for a unifying account of the numerous aspects of intelligence.
3 Who's in the Game? A Scorecard
We have found it to be fascinating to consider who is and isn't in the game. It turns out that
shockingly few people are pursuing the serious computational science of intelligence. (Of course, we
could be unaware of some qualifying researchers | and, needless to say, stand ready to be educated.)
In fact, we haven't located anyone who obviously satises all ve requirements, though it seems to
us that Hutter (2005) comes closest. Running a near second is the work of the late John Pollock
(1995, 2001), specically work related to his Oscar system. In addition, Schmidhuber's (2009, 2006)
work on so-called \G odel machines" would appear to be worthy of serious consideration. Note that
the work of Hutter and Schmidhuber is marked by an emphasis on learning (in fact, the latter
explicitly arms the former's non-knowledge-based learning-based account of universal AI in Hutter
2005), and the conspicuous absence of declarative knowledge, while in Pollock's case the opposite is
true (though Pollock explicitly expects others to work on sub-knowledge-based learning). At least
so far, our analysis of SCSI is steadfastly meta-analysis, and we oer no opinions at this stage
as to whether the detailed content of R&D in the game is good or bad (save for the self-criticism
articulated in the next paragraph).
Note that at least heretofore the work of Bringsjord fails to earn ve armatives, and we don't
even include him in the scorecard. Bringsjord's deductive arguments against \strong" AI are criti-
cal (e.g., Bringsjord & Zenzen 1997), and his constructive work (e.g. in the area of computational
creativity; see Bringsjord & Ferrucci 2000) isn't intended to provide a unifying account of all of
intelligence. The same holds for systems, for example Slate (Bringsjord et al. 2008), designed to
reect all of human reasoning | since after all there is presumably more to intelligence than rea-
soning. Furthermore, while he has articulated a fairly general view of the human mind (Bringsjord
& Zenzen 2003), this view doesn't in its current form reach the standards required by SCSI.
The scorecard given immediately below contains an upper and a lower section. We have reserved
the latter section for those in the computational cognitive modeling (CCM) game. This appears to
be a sub-game, for reasons indicated by relevant occurrences of `No' and `Maybe' in this section of
the scorecard itself. (However, note the grades earned by NARS.) But the issue of the relationship
2between (CCM) and SCSI is inevitably one that will need to be addressed, and is clearly vital,
so we essentially build it into the discussion. We fully expect that the scorecard will be lled out
with grades for other seminal gures in CCM beyond those we mention. These gures have their
own cognitive architectures. Needless to say, we are not entirely condent that the grades we have
assigned are correct in all cases; they are defeasible.
Researcher/System Constructive? Theorem-guided? General? Continuum? Cohesive?
Hutter (UAI) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pollock (1995, 2001) (Oscar) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Russell (1997) Maybe Yes Maybe Yes No
Schmidhuber (2009, 2006) Yes Yes Yes Maybe Maybe
Wang (2006) (NARS) Yes Yes Yes Maybe Yes
Cassimatis et al. forthcoming (Polyscheme) Yes No Yes Maybe Yes
Sun (2001) (Clarion) Yes No Maybe Maybe Yes
Newell & Simon (1997) Laird (1993) (Soar) Yes No Yes No Maybe
Anderson et al. (2003) (ACT-R) Yes No No No Maybe
Langley et al. (2006, 2005, 2004) Yes No No No Maybe
4 Questions Addressed by Papers for the Workshop
Papers (1{2 pages for a position statement; 6{12 for a full paper; agi-10 format must be used) should
be submitted to either Bringsjord or Sundar G via email by the deadline. Papers must address
one or more of the following question groups. It is anticipated that arising from the workshop
there will be a special issue of the Journal of Articial General Intelligence devoted to the serious
computational science of intelligence. The special issue would draw from a pool of papers composed
of not only those submitted for the workshop, but also of papers written outside workshop activity.
Q1 What theories and/or research projects or programs should be developed (or have been developed) for
a sound and complete SCSI?
Q2 Should the quintet of conditions be expanded to include Implementation? Are other modications to
the requirements desired?
Q3 Why is the serious computational science of intelligence important? Why doesn't more of AI, AGI, and
Cog Sci (and, for that matter, economics, decision theory, etc.) R&D fall under this science?
Q4 How good is the work of those currently clearly in the SCSI game? (This question, of course, given the
foregoing, cashes out as evaluation, rst, of Hutter and Pollock.)
Q5 What is the future of SCSI? Is it bright or dark, or somewhere in between? (Authors may want to
at least consider to some degree the economic side of this question, in light of the brute fact that
formal-methods-based computer science arguably hasn't gone swimmingly of late because of money
issues.)
. . .
References
Anderson, J. & Lebiere, C. (2003), `The newell test for a theory of cognition', Behavioral and Brain Sciences
26, 587{640.
Bringsjord, S. (2008a), Declarative/logic-based cognitive modeling, in R. Sun, ed., `The Handbook of Com-
putational Psychology', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 127{169.
URL: http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/sb lccm ab-toc 031607.pdf
Bringsjord, S. (2008b), `The logicist manifesto: At long last let logic-based AI become a eld unto itself',
Journal of Applied Logic 6(4), 502{525.
URL: http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/SB LAI Manifesto 091808.pdf
3Bringsjord, S. & Ferrucci, D. (2000), Articial Intelligence and Literary Creativity: Inside the Mind of
Brutus, a Storytelling Machine, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Bringsjord, S., Noel, R. & Caporale, C. (2000), `Animals, zombanimals, and the total Turing test: The
essence of articial intelligence', Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9, 397{418.
URL: http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/zombanimals.pdf
Bringsjord, S., Taylor, J., Shilliday, A., Clark, M. & Arkoudas, K. (2008), Slate: An Argument-Centered
Intelligent Assistant to Human Reasoners, in F. Grasso, N. Green, R. Kibble & C. Reed, eds, `Proceed-
ings of the 8th International Workshop on Computational Models of Natural Argument (CMNA 8)',
Patras, Greece, pp. 1{10.
URL: http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/Bringsjord etal Slate cmna crc 061708.pdf
Bringsjord, S. & Zenzen, M. (1997), `Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility?',
Synthese 113, 285{320.
Bringsjord, S. & Zenzen, M. (2003), Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Cassimatis, N., Bignoli, P., Bugajska, M., Dugas, S., Murugesan, A. & Bello, P. (forthcoming), `An archi-
tecture for adaptive algorithmic hybrids', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (Part
B) .
Choi, D., Kaufman, M., Langley, P., Nejati, N. & Shapiro, D. (2004), An architecture for persistent reactive
behavior, in `Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems-Volume 2', IEEE Computer Society Washington, DC, USA, pp. 988{995.
Choi, D. & Langley, P. (2005), Learning teleoreactive logic programs from problem solving, in `Proceedings
of the Fifteenth International Conference on Inductive Logic Programming', Springer, pp. 51{68.
Eisenstadt, S. & Simon, H. (1997), `Logic and thought', Minds and Machines 7(3), 365{385.
Floridi, L. (2005), `Consciousness, agents and the knowledge game', Minds and Machines 15(3-4), 415{444.
URL: http://www.philosophyonformation.net/publications/pdf/caatkg.pdf
Hamkins, J. D. & Lewis, A. (2000), `Innite time Turing machines', Journal of Symbolic Logic 65(2), 567{
604.
Hutter, M. (2005), Universal Articial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions Based on Algorithmic Probability,
Springer, New York, NY.
Langley, P. (2006), `Cognitive architectures and general intelligent systems', AI Magazine 27(2), 33{44.
Lewis, H. & Papadimitriou, C. (1981), Elements of the Theory of Computation, Prentice Hall, Englewood
Clis, NJ.
Pollock, J. (1995), Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Pollock, J. (2001), `Defasible reasoning with variable degrees of justication', Articial Intelligence 133, 233{
282.
Rosenbloom, P., Laird, J. & Newell, A., eds (1993), The Soar Papers: Research on Integrated Intelligence,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Russell, S. (1997), `Rationality and Intelligence', Articial Intelligence 94(1-2), 57{77.
Schmidh uber, J. (2006), G odel machines: Fully self-referential optimal universal self-improvers, in B. Go-
ertzel & C. Pennachin, eds, `Articial General Intelligence', Springer, New York, NY, pp. 119{226.
Schmidh uber, J. (2009), `Ultimate cognition  a la G odel', Cognitive Computation 1(2), 177{193.
Spivey, M. (2006), The Continuity of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Sun, R. (2001), Duality of the Mind, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.
Wang, P. (2006), The logic of intelligence, in B. Goertzel & C. Pennachin, eds, `Articial General Intelligence',
Springer, New York, NY, pp. 31{62.
4